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Abstract
What is the price of anarchy when unsplittable demands are routed selﬁshly in general networks with load-dependent edge delays?
Motivated by this question we generalize the model of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (Worst-case equilibria, in: Proc. of the 16th
Annual Symp. on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS ’99), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1563, Springer,
Berlin, 1999, pp. 404–413) to the case of weighted congestion games. We show that varying demands of users crucially affect the
nature of these games, which are no longer isomorphic to exact potential games, even for very simple instances. Indeed we construct
examples where even a single-commodity (weighted) network congestion game may have no pure Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, we prove that any weighted network congestion game with linear edge delays admits a pure Nash equilibrium
that can be found in pseudo-polynomial time. Finally, we consider the family of -layered networks and give a surprising answer
to the question above: the price of anarchy of any weighted congestion game in a -layered network with m edges and edge delays
equal to the loads is (logm/ log log m).
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Consider a model where selﬁsh users having varying demands compete for some shared resources. The quality of
service provided by a resource decreases with its congestion, i.e., the amount of demands of the users willing to be
served by it. Each user may reveal its actual (unique) choice (called a pure strategy) among the resources available
to it, or it may reveal a probability distribution for choosing one of its candidate resources (a mixed strategy). The
users determine their actual behavior based on other users’ behavior, but they do not cooperate. We are interested in
situations where the users have reached some kind of equilibrium. The most popular notion of equilibrium in non-
cooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium: a “stable point” among the users, from which no user is willing to
deviate unilaterally. In [14] the notion of the coordination ratio or price of anarchy was introduced, as a means for
measuring the performance degradation due to lack of users’ coordination when sharing common goods.
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A realistic scenario for the above model is when unsplittable demands are routed selﬁshly in general networks with
load-dependent edge delays. When the underlying network consists of two nodes and parallel links between them,
there has been an extensive study on the existence and computability of equilibria, as well as on the price of anarchy.
Motivated by the work of [14], we generalize their concept to the weighted congestion games in a non-trivial way.
When users have identical demands, such a game is indeed isomorphic to an exact potential game [19] and thus always
possesses a pure Nash equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium where each user adopts a pure strategy. We show that varying
demands of users crucially affect the nature of these games, which are no longer isomorphic to exact potential games.
Indeed, we construct examples where even a single-commodity (weighted) network congestion game may have no pure
Nash equilibrium at all.
On the other hand, we prove that any weighted multi-commodity network congestion game with linear resource
delays admits a pure Nash equilibrium. We also propose a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for constructing one.
Finally, we study the price of anarchy forweighted single-commodity network congestion games on -layered networks.
We come to a rather surprising conclusion: within constant factors, the worst case instance (wrt the price of anarchy)
among weighted -layered network congestion games with m edges and edge delays equal to the loads is the parallel
links game introduced in [14].
2. The model
Consider having a set of resources E in a system. For each e ∈ E, let de(·) be the delay per user that requests
its service, as a function of the total usage of this resource by all the users. Each such function is considered to be
non-decreasing in the total usage of the corresponding resource. Each resource may be represented by a pair of points:
an entry point to the resource and an exit point from it. So, we represent each resource by an arc from its entry point to
its exit point and we associate with this arc the cost (e.g., the delay as a function of the load of this resource) that each
user has to pay if she is served by this resource. The entry/exit points of the resources need not be unique; they may
coincide in order to express the possibility of offering joint service to users, that consists of a sequence of resources.
We denote by V the set of all entry/exit points of the resources in the system. Any non-empty collection of resources
corresponding to a directed path in G ≡ (V ,E) comprises an action in the system.
Let N ≡ [n] be a set of users, each willing to adopt some action in the system. ∀i ∈ N , let wi denote user i’s demand
(e.g., the ﬂow rate from a source node to a destination node), while i ⊆ 2E \ ∅ is the collection of actions, any of
which would satisfy user i (e.g., alternative routes from a source to a destination node, if G represents a communication
network). The collectioni is called the action set of user i and each of its elements contains at least one resource.Any
vector r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈  ≡ ×ni=1i is a pure strategies proﬁle, or a conﬁguration of the users. Any vector of real
functions p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) s.t. ∀i ∈ [n], pi : i → [0, 1] is a probability distribution over the set of allowable
actions for user i
(
i.e.,
∑
ri∈i pi(ri) = 1
)
is called a mixed strategies proﬁle for the n users.
A congestion model typically deals with users of identical demands, and thus, user cost function depending on the
number of users adopting each action [22,19,7]. In this work we consider the more general case, where a weighted
congestion model is the tuple ((wi)i∈N, (i )i∈N, (de)e∈E). That is, we allow the users to have different demands for
service from the whole system, and thus affect the resource delay functions in a different way, depending on their
own weights. A weighted congestion game associated with this model is a game in strategic form with the set of users
N and user demands (wi)i∈N , the action sets (i )i∈N and cost functions (iri )i∈N,ri∈i deﬁned as follows: for any
conﬁguration r ∈  and ∀e ∈ E, let e(r) = {i ∈ N : e ∈ ri} be the set of users exploiting resource e according to
r (called the view of resource e wrt conﬁguration r). The cost i (r) of user i for adopting strategy ri ∈ i in a given
conﬁguration r is equal to the cumulative delay ri (r) along this path:
i (r) = ri (r) =
∑
e∈ri
de(e(r)), (1)
where ∀e ∈ E, e(r) ≡ ∑i∈e(r) wi is the load on resource e wrt the conﬁguration r.
On the other hand, for a mixed strategies proﬁle p, the expected cost of user i for adopting strategy ri ∈ i is
iri (p) =
∑
r−i∈−i
P
(
p−i, r−i
)
· ∑
e∈ri
de
(
e(r
−i ⊕ ri)
)
, (2)
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where r−i is a conﬁguration of all the users except for user i, p−i is the mixed strategies proﬁle of all users except
for i, r−i ⊕ ri is the new conﬁguration with user i choosing strategy ri , and P
(
p−i, r−i
) ≡ ∏j∈N\{i} pj (rj ) is the
occurrence probability of r−i.
Remark 1. We abuse notation a little bit and consider the user costs iri as functions whose exact deﬁnition depends on
the other users’ strategies: in the general case of a mixed strategies proﬁle p, Eq. (2) is valid and expresses the expected
cost of user i wrt p, conditioned on the event that i chooses path ri . If the other users adopt a pure strategies proﬁle r−i,
we get the special form of Eq. (1) that expresses the exact cost of user i choosing action ri .
A congestion game in which all users are indistinguishable (i.e., they have the same user cost functions) and have
the same action set is called symmetric. When each user’s action set i consists of sets of resources that comprise
(simple) paths between a unique origin–destination pair of nodes (si, ti) in an network G = (V ,E), we refer to a
network congestion game. If additionally all origin–destination pairs of the users coincide with a unique pair (s, t)
we have a single commodity network congestion game and then all users share exactly the same action set. Observe
that a single-commodity network congestion game is not necessarily symmetric because the users may have different
demands and thus their cost functions will also differ.
Selﬁsh behavior: Fix an arbitrary (mixed in general) strategies proﬁle p for a congestion game ((wi)i∈N, (i )i∈N,
(de)e∈E). We say that p is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if and only if ∀i ∈ N,∀ri, i ∈ i , pi(ri) > 0 ⇒ iri (p)ii (p).
A conﬁguration r ∈  is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if and only if ∀i ∈ N,∀i ∈ i , ri (r)i (r−i ⊕i ) where
r−i ⊕ i is the same conﬁguration with r except for user i that now chooses action i . The social cost SC(p) in this
congestion game is the expected maximum cost among all the users:
SC(p) = ∑
r∈
P(p, r) · max
i∈N {ri (r)}, (3)
where P(p, r) ≡ ∏ni=1 pi(ri) is the probability of conﬁguration r occurring, wrt the mixed strategies proﬁle p. The
social optimum of this game is deﬁned as the minimum (over all possible conﬁgurations) maximum (over all users)
user cost
OPT = min
r∈
{
max
i∈N [ri (r)]
}
. (4)
The price of anarchy for this game is then deﬁned as follows:
R = max
p is a NE
{
SC(p)
OPT
}
. (5)
We consider atomic assignments of users to actions, i.e., each user i ∈ N requires all its demand wi from exactly one
allowable action ri ∈ i . Nevertheless, we allow users to adopt mixed strategies. Our focus in this paper is two-fold:
we are interested in families of resource delay functions for which a weighted network congestion game possesses a
PNE, and we are also interested in the price of anarchy for a special case of this problem where G has the form of an
-layered network and the delay functions are identical to the loads of the resources.
3. Related work
Existence and tractability of PNE: It is already known that the class of unweighted (atomic) congestion games
(i.e., users have the same demands and thus, the same affection on the resource delay functions) is guaranteed
to possess at least one PNE: actually, Rosenthal [22] proved that any potential game has at least one PNE and
it is easy to write any unweighted congestion game as an exact potential game using Rosenthal’s potential function 1
1 For more details on Potential Games, see [19].
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(e.g., [7, Theorem 1]). In [7] it is proved that a PNE for any unweighted single-commodity network congestion
game 2 (no matter what resource delay functions are considered, so long as they are non-decreasing with loads) can be
constructed in polynomial time, by computing the optimum of Rosenthal’s potential function, through a nice reduction
to an instance of the min-cost ﬂow problem. On the other hand, it is shown in the same work that even for a symmetric
congestion game or an unweighted multi-commodity network congestion game, it is PLS-complete to construct a PNE
(though it certainly exists).
The special case of single-commodity, parallel-edges network congestion game where the resources are considered
to behave as parallel machines, has been extensively studied in recent literature. In [9] it was shown that for the case of
users with varying demands and uniformly related parallel machines, there is always a PNE which can be constructed
in polynomial time. It was also shown that it is NP-hard to construct the best or the worst PNE. In [10] it was proved
that the fully mixed NE (FMNE), introduced and thoroughly studied in [17], is worse than any PNE, and any NE is at
most (6 + ) times worse than the FMNE, for varying users and identical parallel machines. In [16] it was shown that
the FMNE is the worst possible for the case of two related machines and tasks of the same size. In [15] it was proved
that the FMNE is the worst possible when the global objective is the sum of squares of loads.
Feldman et al. [8] studied the problem of constructing a PNE from any initial conﬁguration, of social cost at most
equal to that of the initial conﬁguration. This immediately implies the existence of a PTAS for computing a PNE of
minimum social cost: ﬁrst compute a conﬁguration of social cost at most (1 + ) times the social optimum [11], and
consequently transform it into a PNE of at most the same social cost. In [6] it is also shown that even for the unrelated
parallel machines case a PNE always exists, and a potential-based argument proves a convergence time (in case of
integer demands) from arbitrary initial conﬁguration to a PNE in timeO(mWtot+4Wtot/m+wmax)whereWtot = ∑i∈N wi
and wmax = maxi∈N {wi}.
Milchtaich [18] studies the problem of weighted parallel-edges network congestion games with user-speciﬁc costs:
each allowable action of a user consists of a single resource and each user has its own private cost function for each
resource. It is shown that: (1) weighted (parallel-edges network) congestion games involving only two users, or only
two possible actions for all the users, or equal delay functions (and thus, equal weights), always possess a PNE;
(2) even a single-commodity, 3-user, 3-actions, weighted (parallel-edges network) congestion game may not possess
a PNE (using 3-wise linear delay functions).
Price of anarchy in congestion games: In the seminal paper [14] the notion of coordination ratio, or price of anarchy,
was introduced as a means for measuring the performance degradation due to lack of users’ coordination when sharing
common resources. In this work it was proved that the price of anarchy is 3/2 for two related parallel machines, while
for m machines and users of varying demands, R = (logm/ log logm) and R = O(√m logm). For m identical
parallel machines, [17] proved that R = (logm/ log logm) for the FMNE, while for the case of m identical parallel
machines and users of varying demands it was shown in [13] thatR = (logm/ log logm). In [4] it was ﬁnally shown
that R = (logm/ log log logm) for the general case of related machines and users of varying demands. Czumaj
et al. [3] present a thorough study of the case of general, monotone delay functions on parallel machines, with emphasis
on delay functions from queuing theory. Unlike the case of linear cost functions, they show that the price of anarchy
for non-linear delay functions in general is far worse and often even unbounded.
In [23] the price of anarchy in a multi-commodity network congestion game among inﬁnitely many users, each of
negligible demand is studied. The social cost in this case is expressed by the total delay paid by the whole ﬂow in the
system. For linear resource delays, the price of anarchy is at most 4/3. For general, continuous, non-decreasing resource
delay functions, the total delay of any Nash ﬂow is at most equal to the total delay of an optimal ﬂow for double ﬂow
demands. Roughgarden [24] proves that for this setting, it is actually the class of allowable latency functions and not
the speciﬁc topology of a network that determines the price of anarchy.
4. Our contribution
In this paper, we generalize the model of [14] (KP-model) to the weighted congestion games.We also deﬁne a special
class of networks, the -layered networks, which demonstrate a rather surprising behavior: their worst instance wrt the
2 Since [7] only considers unit-demand users, this is also a symmetric network congestion game.
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price of anarchy is (within constant factors) the parallel links network introduced in [14]. More speciﬁcally, we prove
the following results:
• Weighted congestion games are not isomorphic to potential games. We show the existence of weighted single-
commodity network congestion games with resource delays being either linear or 2-wise linear functions of the
loads, for which a PNE cannot exist (Lemma 6).
• There exist weighted single-commodity network congestion games which admit no exact potential function, even
when the resource delays are identical to their loads (Lemma 3).
• Any weighted (multi-commodity) network congestion game with linear resource delays admits a PNE which can
be constructed in pseudo-polynomial time (Theorem 1).
• The price of anarchy of any weighted -layered network congestion game with m resources (edges) and
resource delays equal to their loads is at most 8e(logm/ log logm+1), where e is the basis of the natural logarithm
(Theorem 7). To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst time that the KP-model is studied in non-trivial networks (other than
the parallel links).
5. Preliminaries
Conﬁguration paths and dynamics graph: For a congestion game  = ((wi)i∈N, (i )i∈N, (de)e∈E), a path in
 = ×i∈Ni is a sequence of conﬁgurations  = (r(0), r(1), . . . , r(k)) s.t. ∀j ∈ [k], r(j) = r(j − 1)−i ⊕ i , for
some i ∈ N and i ∈ i .  is a closed path if r(0) = r(k). It is a simple path if no conﬁguration is contained in it more
than once.  is an improvement path wrt , if ∀j ∈ [k], ij (r(j)) < ij (r(j − 1)) where ij is the unique user differing
in its strategy between r(j) and r(j − 1). That is, the unique defector of the j th move in  is actually willing to make
the move because this move improves its own cost. The Dynamics Graph of  is a directed graph whose vertices are
conﬁgurations and there is an arc from a conﬁguration r to a conﬁguration r−i ⊕ i for some i ∈ i if and only if
i (r) > i (r−i ⊕ i ).
Layered networks: We consider a special family of networks whose behavior wrt the price of anarchy is (as we shall
prove here) asymptotically equivalent to that of the parallel links model of [14], which is actually a 1-layered network:
let 1 be an integer. A directed network G = (V ,E) with a distinguished source–destination pair (s, t), s, t ∈ V
is -layered if every directed s − t path has length exactly  and each node lies on a directed s − t path. In a layered
network there are no directed cycles and all directed paths are simple. In the following, we always use m to denote the
number |E| of edges in an -layered network G = (V ,E). We use P to denote the set of all directed s − t paths in G.
6. Pure Nash equilibria
In this section we deal with the existence and tractability of PNE in weighted network congestion games. First, we
show that it is not always the case that a PNE exists, even for a weighted single-commodity network congestion game
with only linear and 2-wise linear (e.g., the maximum of two linear functions) resource delays. In contrast, it is well
known [22,7] that any unweighted (not necessarily single-commodity, or even network) congestion game has a PNE,
for any kind of non-decreasing delays.
Lemma 1. There exist instances of weighted single-commodity network congestion games with resource delays being
either linear or 2-wise linear functions of the loads, for which there is no PNE.
Proof. We demonstrate this by the example shown in Fig. 1. In this example there are exactly two users of
demands w1 = 1 and w2 = 2, from node s to node t. The possible paths that the two users may follow are
labeled in the ﬁgure. The resource delay functions are indicated by the three possible values they may take, given
the weights of the two users. Observe now that this example has no PNE: there is a simple closed path  =
((P 3, P2), (P3, P4), (P1, P4), (P1, P2), (P3, P2)) of length 4 that is an improvement path (actually, each de-
fecting user moves to its new best choice) and additionally, any other conﬁguration not belonging in  is either one, or
two best-choice moves away from some of these nodes. Therefore, there is no sink in the Dynamics Graph of the game
and thus there exists no PNE. Observe that the delay functions are not user-speciﬁc in our example, as was the case
in [18]. 
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Fig. 1. A weighted single-commodity network congestion game that may have no PNE. Consider two players with demands w1 = 1 and w2 = 2.
The notation a/b/c means that a load of 1 has delay a, a load of 2 has delay b and a load of 3 has delay c.
Consequently, we show that there may exist no exact potential function3 for a weighted single-commodity network
congestion game, even when the resource delays are identical to their loads. The next argument shows that Theorem
3.1 of [19] does not hold anymore even in this simplest case of weighted congestion games. It should be mentioned
that the same result has been independently proved also in [25].
Lemma 2. There exist weighted single-commodity network congestion games which are not exact potential games,
even when the resource delays are identical to their loads.
Proof. Let  = ((wi)i∈N, (i )i∈N, (de)e∈E) denote a weighted single-commodity network congestion game with
de(x) = x,∀e ∈ E. Recall the deﬁnition of users’ costs for a conﬁguration (Eq. (1)). Let us now deﬁne the quantity
I (, ) ≡
r∑
k=1
[ik (r(k)) − ik (r(k − 1))],
where ik is the unique user in which the conﬁgurations r(k) and r(k − 1) differ. Our proof is based on the fact that 
is an (exact) potential game if and only if every simple closed path  of length 4 has I (, ) = 0 [19, Theorem 2.8].
For the sake of contradiction, assume that every closed simple path  of length 4 for  has I (, ) = 0, ﬁx arbitrary
conﬁguration r, and consider the path
 = (r, x = r−1 ⊕ 1, y = r−(1,2) ⊕ (1, 2), z = r−2 ⊕ 2, r)
for some paths 1 = r1 and 2 = r2. We shall demonstrate that I (, ) cannot be identically 0 when there are at least
two users of different demands. So, consider that the ﬁrst two users have different demands: w1 = w2. We observe that
1(x) − 1(r) = ∑
e∈1
e(x) − ∑
e∈r1
e(r) = |1 \ r1| · w1 + ∑
e∈1\r1
e(r) − ∑
e∈r1\1
e(r)
since the resources in r1 ∩ 1 retain their initial loads. Similarly we have
2(y) − 2(x) = ∑
e∈2\r2
[e(x) + w2] − ∑
e∈r2\2
e(x) = |2 \ r2| · w2 + ∑
e∈2\r2
e(x) − ∑
e∈r2\2
e(x),
1(z) − 1(y) = ∑
e∈r1\1
e(z) − ∑
e∈1\r1
[e(z) + w1] = ∑
e∈r1\1
e(z) − ∑
e∈1\r1
e(z) − |1 \ r1| · w1,
2(r) − 2(z) = ∑
e∈r2\2
e(r) − ∑
e∈2\r2
e(r) − |2 \ r2| · w2.
3 Fix some vector b ∈ Rn>0. A function F : ×i∈Ni → R is a b-potential for a weighted congestion game  = ((wi)i∈N , (i )i∈N , (de)e∈E),
if ∀r ∈ ×i∈Ni ,∀i ∈ N,∀i ∈ i , i (r) − i (r−i ⊕ i ) = bi · [F(r) − F(r−i ⊕ i )]. It is an exact potential for , if b = 1.
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Thus, since I ≡ I (, ) = 1(x) − 1(r) + 2(y) − 2(x) + 1(z) − 1(y) + 2(r) − 2(z), we get
I = ∑
e∈1\r1
[e(r) − e(z)] + ∑
e∈2\r2
[e(x) − e(r)] + ∑
e∈r1\1
[e(z) − e(r)] + ∑
e∈r2\2
[e(r) − e(x)].
Observe now that 4
∀ e ∈ 1 \ r1, e(r) − e(z) = e(r) − e(r−2 ⊕ 2) = w2 · (I[e∈r2\2] − I[e∈2\r2]),
∀ e ∈ 2 \ r2, e(x) − e(r) = e(r−1 ⊕ 1) − e(r) = w1 · (I[e∈1\r1] − I[e∈r1\1]),
∀ e ∈ r1 \ 1, e(z) − e(r) = e(r−2 ⊕ 2) − e(r) = w2 · (I[e∈2\r2] − I[e∈r2\2]),
∀ e ∈ r2 \ 2, e(r) − e(x) = e(r) − e(r−1 ⊕ 1) = w1 · (I[e∈r1\1] − I[e∈1\r1]).
Then,
I = (w1 − w2) · [|(1 \ r1) ∩ (2 \ r2)| + |(r1 \ 1) ∩ (r2 \ 2)|
−|(r1 \ 1) ∩ (2 \ r2)| − |(1 \ r1) ∩ (r2 \ 2)|],
which is typically not equal to zero for a single-commodity network. It should be noted that the second parameter, which
is network dependent, can be non-zero even for some cycle of a very simple network. For example, in the network of
Fig. 1 (which is a simple 2-layered network) the simple closed path
(r(0) = (P1, P3), r(1) = (P2, P3), r(2) = (P2, P1), r(3) = (P1, P1), r(4) = (P1, P3))
has this quantity equal to −4 and thus, no weighted single-commodity network congestion game on this network can
admit an exact potential. 
Our next step is to prove that any weighted multi-commodity network congestion game with linear resource delays
admits at least one PNE, which can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time. Recall that Rosenthal’s (exact) potential
function [7] for unweighted congestion games is
∀r ∈ ×i∈Ni , 	ros(r) ≡ ∑
e∈∪i∈Nri
e(r)∑
k=1
de(k).
We already know that even the case of weighted -layered network congestion games with delays equal to the loads
cannot have any exact potential. 5 We next show that a non-trivial generalization of Rosenthal’s potential function is a
b-potential for weighted multi-commodity network congestion games with linear resource delays.
Theorem 1. For any weighted multi-commodity network congestion game with linear resource delays, at least one
PNE exists and can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary network G = (V ,E) with linear resource/edge delays de(x) = aex + be, e ∈ E, ae, be0.
Let r ∈  be an arbitrary conﬁguration for the corresponding weighted multi-commodity congestion game on G. For
the conﬁguration r we consider the potential 	(r) = C(r) + W(r), where 6
C(r) = ∑
e∈E
de(e(r))e(r) = ∑
e∈E
[
ae
2
e(r) + bee(r)
]
,
and
W(r) =
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈ri
de(wi)wi = ∑
e∈E
∑
i∈e(r)
de(wi)wi = ∑
e∈E
∑
i∈e(r)
(
aew
2
i + bewi
)
.
4 For any logical expression E , I[E] is the indicator variable of this expression being true.
5 The example at the end of the Proof of Lemma 3 involves the 3-layered network of Fig. 1.
6 For linear resource delays, Rosenthal’s potential function is essentially identical to C(r).
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Let i be a user of demand wi , let i ∈ i be a si − ti path different from ri , and let r′ ≡ r−i ⊕ i . First of all, we
observe that for each edge e ∈ E \ ((i \ ri)∪ (ri \i )),e(r) = e(r′) and e(r) = e(r′). On the other hand, for each
edge e ∈ i \ ri , e(r′) = e(r) ∪ {i} and e(r′) = e(r) + wi , while for each edge e ∈ ri \ i , e(r′) = e(r) \ {i}
and e(r′) = e(r) − wi . Therefore,
C(r′) − C(r) = ∑
e∈E
de(e(r
′))e(r′) − ∑
e∈E
de(e(r))e(r)
= ∑
e∈i\ri
[
de(e(r) + wi)(e(r) + wi) − de(e(r))e(r)
]
+ ∑
e∈ri\i
[
de(e(r) − wi)(e(r) − wi) − de(e(r))e(r)
]
= ∑
e∈i\ri
[
ae(e(r) + wi)2 + be(e(r) + wi) − ae2e(r) − bee(r)
]
+ ∑
e∈ri\i
[
ae(e(r) − wi)2 + be(e(r) − wi) − ae2e(r) − bee(r)
]
= 2wi ∑
e∈i\ri
[
ae(e(r) + wi) + be
]− ∑
e∈i\ri
[
aew
2
i + bewi
]
−2wi ∑
e∈ri\i
[
aee(r) + be
]+ ∑
e∈ri\i
[
aew
2
i + bewi
]
= 2wi
[ ∑
e∈i\ri
de
(
e(r
′)
)− ∑
e∈ri\i
de (e(r))
]
−
[ ∑
e∈i\ri
(
aew
2
i + bewi
)
− ∑
e∈ri\i
(
aew
2
i + bewi
)]
.
On the other hand,
W(r′) − W(r) = ∑
e∈E
∑
j∈e(r′)
(
aew
2
j + bewj
)
− ∑
e∈E
∑
j∈e(r)
(
aew
2
j + bewj
)
= ∑
e∈E
[ ∑
j∈e(r′)\e(r)
(
aew
2
j + bewj
)
− ∑
j∈e(r)\e(r′)
(
aew
2
j + bewj
)]
= ∑
e∈i\ri
(
aew
2
i + bewi
)
− ∑
e∈ri\i
(
aew
2
i + bewi
)
since for each e ∈ i \ ri, e(r′) = e(r) ∪ {i}, for each e ∈ ri \ i , e(r′) = e(r) \ {i}, and for each
e ∈ (i \ ri) ∪ (ri \ i ), e(r′) = e(r).
Combining the equalities above, we obtain that
	(r′) − 	(r) = 2wi
[ ∑
e∈i\ri
de(e(r
′)) − ∑
e∈ri\i
de(e(r))
]
= 2wi
[∑
e∈i
de(e(r
′)) − ∑
e∈ri
de(e(r))
]
.
The second equality follows from the fact that for each edge e ∈ i ∩ ri , e(r′) = e(r).
Since i (r′) = i (r′) =
∑
e∈i de(e(r
′)) and i (r) = ri (r) =
∑
e∈ri de(e(r)), we conclude that
	(r′) − 	(r) = 2wi
[
i (r′) − i (r)
]
,
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Fig. 2. Example of an -layered network with linear resource delays and unbounded anarchy.
and 	 is a b-potential for bi = 1/2wi , i ∈ N . Therefore, any weighted multi-commodity network congestion game
with linear resource delays admits a PNE. 7
Wlog we can assume that all wi’s, ae’s and be’s are integers. Then each user performing any improving defection
must reduce its cost by at least 1 and thus the potential function decreases by at least 2wmin2 along each arc of the
Dynamics Graph of the game. Consequently, the naive algorithm that, starting from an arbitrary initial conﬁguration
r ∈ , follows any improvement path that leads to a sink (i.e., a PNE) of the Dynamics Graph, cannot move more than
Wtot
∑
e∈E de(Wtot) times, since ∀r ∈ ,	(r)2Wtot
∑
e∈E de(Wtot). 
7. The price of anarchy in -layered networks
In this section we focus our interest on weighted -layered network congestion games where the resource delays are
identical to their loads. This case comprises a non-trivial generalization of routing through identical parallel channels.
The main reason why we focus on this speciﬁc category of resource delays is that selﬁsh unsplittable ﬂows can
have unbounded price of anarchy even for linear resource delays. In [23, p. 256] an example is given where the price
of anarchy is unbounded. This example is trivially converted in an -layered network. The resource delay functions
used are either constant or M/M/1-like delay functions. Thus, one might claim that is actually the main reason for the
unboundedness of the price of anarchy in this setting. Nevertheless, we can be equally bad even with linear resource
delay functions: observe the following example of Fig. 2. Two users, each of unit demand, want to move selﬁshly from
s to t. The edge delays are shown above them. We assume that a?b?1c. It is easy to see that the conﬁguration
(sCBt,sADt) is a PNE of social cost 2 + b while the optimum conﬁguration is (sABt,sCDt) whose social optimum is
2 + c. Thus, R = (b + 2)/(c + 2).
In the following, we restrict our attention to -layered networks whose resource delays are equal to their loads. Our
main tool is to interpret a strategies proﬁle as a ﬂow in the underlying network.
Flows and mixed strategies proﬁles: Fix an arbitrary -layered network G = (V ,E) and n distinct users willing to
satisfy their own trafﬁc demands from the unique source s ∈ V to the unique destination t ∈ V . Again, w = (wi)i∈[n]
denotes the varying demands of the users. W log we assume that wi’s are non-negative integers. Fix an arbitrary
mixed strategies proﬁle p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn). A feasible ﬂow for the n users is a function 
 : P → R0, s.t.∑
∈P 
() = Wtot ≡
∑
i∈[n] wi , i.e., all users’ demands are actually met. We distinguish between unsplittable and
splittable (feasible) ﬂows. A ﬂow is unsplittable if each user’s trafﬁc demand is satisﬁed by a unique path of P . A ﬂow
is splittable if the trafﬁc demand of each user can be routed over several paths of P .
We map the mixed strategies proﬁle p to a ﬂow 
p as follows: for each s − t path  ∈ P , 
p() ≡
∑
i∈[n] wi ·pi().
That is, we handle the expected load traveling along  according to p as a splittable ﬂow, where user i routes a fraction
of pi() of its total demand wi along . Observe that, if p is actually a pure strategies proﬁle, the corresponding ﬂow
is then unsplittable. Recall now that for each edge e ∈ E,
e(p) ≡
n∑
i=1
∑
:e∈
wipi() = ∑
:e∈

p() ≡ e(
p)
7 Actually, even if for a ﬁnite game there is a function s.t. the sign of its differences for adjacent nodes in the Dynamics Graph agrees with the
sign of the differences of the corresponding costs whenever these are non-zero (this is called a generalized ordinal potential function), the Finite
Improvement Property holds and thus we have a PNE [19].
D. Fotakis et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 348 (2005) 226–239 235
denotes the expected load (and in our case, also the expected delay) of e wrt p. As for the expected delay along a path
 ∈ P according to p, this is
(p) ≡ ∑
e∈
e(p) = ∑
e∈
∑
′:e∈′

p(
′) = ∑
′∈P
| ∩ ′|
p(′) ≡ (
p).
Let min(
) = min∈P {(
)} be the minimum expected delay among all s − t paths. From now on for simplicity we
drop the subscript of p from its corresponding ﬂow 
p, when this is clear by the context. We evaluate ﬂow 
 using the
objective of maximum latency, which is deﬁned as
L(
) ≡ max
:
()>0{(
)} = max:∃i,pi ()>0{(p)} ≡ L(p). (6)
L(
) is nothing but the maximum expected delay paid by the users, wrt p. From now on, we use 
∗ and 
∗f to denote
the optimal unsplittable and splittable ﬂows, respectively.
In addition, we sometimes evaluate ﬂow 
 using the objective of total latency, which is deﬁned as
C(
) ≡ ∑
∈P

()(
) = ∑
e∈E
2e(
) =
∑
e∈E
2e(p) ≡ C(p). (7)
The second equality is obtained by summing over the edges of  and reversing the order of the summation.
Flows at Nash equilibrium: Let p be a mixed strategies proﬁle and let 
 be the corresponding ﬂow. For a -layered
network with resource delays equal to the loads, the cost of user i on path  is i(p) = wi + −i (p), where −i (p) is
the expected delay along path  if the demand of user i was removed from the system:
−i (p) =
∑
′∈P
| ∩ ′|∑
j =i
wjpj (
′) = (p) − wi ∑
′∈P
| ∩ ′|pi(′). (8)
Thus, i(p) = (p)+
[
 −∑′∈P | ∩ ′|pi(′)]wi . Observe now that, if p is a NE, then L(p) = L(
)min(
)+
wmax. Otherwise, the users routing their trafﬁc on a path of expected delay greater than min(
)+wmax could improve
their delay by defecting to a path of expected delay min(
). We sometimes say that a ﬂow 
 corresponding to a mixed
strategies proﬁle p is a NE with the understanding that it is actually p which is a NE.
Maximum latency versus total latency: We show that if the resource delays are equal to their loads, a splittable ﬂow
is optimal wrt the objective of maximum latency if and only if it is optimal wrt the objective of total latency. As a
corollary, we obtain that the optimal splittable ﬂow deﬁnes a NE where all users adopt the same mixed strategy.
Lemma 3. There is a unique feasible splittable ﬂow 
 which minimizes both L(
) and C(
).
Proof. For every feasible ﬂow 
, the average latency of 
 cannot exceed its maximum latency:
C(
) = ∑
∈P

()(
) = ∑
:
()>0

()(
)L(
)Wtot. (9)
A splittable ﬂow 
 minimizes C(
) if and only if for every ′,  ∈ P with 
(′) > 0, ′(
)(
) (e.g., [2],
[21, Section 7.2], [23, Corollary 4.2]). In addition, for every ﬂow 
, there exists a ′ ∈ P with 
(′) > 0 such that
L(
) = ′(
). Hence, if 
 is optimal wrt the objective of total latency, for all paths  ∈ P , ′(
) = L(
)(
)
because 
(′) > 0. Moreover, by deﬁnition of L, for all paths  ∈ P with 
() > 0, L(
)(
). Thus, L(
) = (
)
for every path  with 
() > 0. Therefore, if 
 minimizes C(
), the average latency is equal to the maximum latency:
C(
) = ∑
∈P :
()>0

()(
) = L(
)Wtot. (10)
Let 
 be the feasible splittable ﬂow that minimizes the total latency and let 
′ be the feasible splittable ﬂow that
minimizes the maximum latency. We prove the lemma by establishing that the two ﬂows are identical.
Observe that L(
′)C(
′)/WtotC(
)/Wtot = L(
). The ﬁrst inequality follows from Ineq. (9), the second
from the assumption that 
 minimizes the total latency and the last equality from Eq. (10). On the other hand, it
must be L(
′)L(
) because of the assumption that the ﬂow 
′ minimizes the maximum latency. Hence, it must
be L(
′) = L(
) and C(
′) = C(
). In addition, since the function C(
) is strictly convex and the set of feasible
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splittable ﬂows forms a convex polytope, there is a unique ﬂowwhichminimizes the total latency. Thus, 
 and 
′ must be
identical. 
The following corollary states that the optimal splittable ﬂow deﬁnes a mixed NE where all users adopt exactly the
same strategy.
Corollary 1. Let 
∗f be the optimal splittable ﬂow and let p be the mixed strategies proﬁle where every user routes its
trafﬁc on each path  with probability 
∗f ()/Wtot. Then, p is a NE.
Proof. By construction, the expected path loads corresponding to p are equal to the values of 
∗f on these paths. Since
all users follow exactly the same strategy and route their demand on each path  with probability 
∗f /Wtot, for each
user i,
−i (p) = (p) − wi
∑
′∈P
| ∩ ′| 

∗
f (
′)
Wtot
=
(
1 − wi
Wtot
)
(p).
Since the ﬂow 
∗f alsominimizes the total latency, for every 1, 2 ∈ P with 
∗f (1) > 0, 1(p)2(p) (e.g., [2], [21,
Section 7.2], [23, Corollary 4.2]), which also implies that −i1 (p)−i2 (p). Therefore, for every user i and every 1, 2 ∈
P such that the user i routes its demand on1 with positive probability, i1(p) = wi+−i1 (p)wi+−i2 (p) = i2(p).
Consequently, p is a NE. 
An upper bound on the social cost: Next we derive an upper bound on the social cost of every strategy proﬁle
whose maximum expected delay (i.e., the maximum latency of its associated ﬂow) is within a constant factor from the
maximum latency of the optimal unsplittable ﬂow.
Lemma 4. Let 
∗ be the optimal unsplittable ﬂow, and let p be a mixed strategies proﬁle and 
 its corresponding
ﬂow. If L(p) = L(
)L(
∗), for some 1, then
SC(p)(+ 1)O
(
logm
log logm
)
L(
∗),
where m = |E| denotes the number of edges in the network.
Proof. For each edge e ∈ E and each user i, let Xe,i be the random variable describing the actual load routed through e
by i. The random variableXe,i is equal towi if i routes its demand on a path  including e and 0 otherwise. Consequently,
the expectation of Xe,i is equal to E[Xe,i] = ∑:e∈wipi(). Since each user selects its path independently, for every
ﬁxed edge e, the random variables {Xe,i, i ∈ [n]} are independent from each other.
For each edge e ∈ E, let Xe = ∑ni=1 Xe,i be the random variable that describes the actual load routed through e,
and thus, also the actual delay paid by any user traversing e. Xe is the sum of n independent random variables with
values in [0, wmax]. By linearity of expectation,
E[Xe] =
n∑
i=1
E[Xe,i] =
n∑
i=1
wi
∑
:e∈
pi() = e(
).
By applying the standard Hoeffding bound 8 with w = wmax and t = ek max{e(
), wmax}, we obtain that for every
k1,
P[Xeek max{e(
), wmax}]k−ek.
For m ≡ |E|, we apply the union bound and conclude that for every k1,
P[∃e ∈ E : Xeek max{e(
), wmax}]mk−ek. (11)
8 We use the standard version of Hoeffding bound [12]: let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent random variables with values in the interval [0, w].
Let X = ∑ni=1 Xi and let E[X] denote its expectation. Then, ∀t > 0, P[X t] (eE[X]/t)t/w .
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For each path  ∈ P with 
() > 0, we deﬁne the random variable X = ∑e∈Xe describing the actual delay
along . The social cost of p, which is equal to the expected maximum delay experienced by some user cannot exceed
the expected maximum delay among paths  with 
() > 0. Formally,
SC(p)E
[
max
:
()>0{X}
]

∞∑
i=0
P
[
max
:
()>0{X} i
]
. (12)
The last inequality holds because max:
()>0 {X} takes only non-negative integer values since wi’s are non-negative
integers. It is well-known that for all non-negative integer-valued random variables X, E[X] = ∑∞i=0 P[X > i] (e.g.
[20, Proposition C.7]).
If for all e ∈ E, Xe < ek max{e(
), wmax}, then for every path  ∈ P with 
() > 0,
X = ∑
e∈
Xe < ek
∑
e∈
max{e(
), wmax}ek∑
e∈
(e(
) + wmax)
= ek((
) + wmax)ek(L(
) + wmax)e(+ 1)kL(
∗).
The third equality follows from (
) = ∑e∈ e(
), the fourth inequality from (
)L(
) since 
() > 0, and the
last inequality from the hypothesis that L(
)L(
∗) and the fact that wmaxL(
∗) because 
∗ is an unsplittable
ﬂow. Therefore, using Ineq. (11), we conclude that
P
[
max
:
()>0{X}e(+ 1)kL(

∗)
]
mk−ek. (13)
In other words, the probability that the actual maximum delay caused by p exceeds the optimal maximum delay by a
factor e(+ 1)k or greater is at most mk−ek .
Using Ineq. (12), we obtain that for every 02,
SC(p)  e(+ 1)0L(
∗) +
∞∑
i=e(+1)0L(
∗)
P
[
max
:
()>0{X} i
]
 e(+ 1)0L(
∗) +
∞∑
k=0
e(+ 1)L(
∗)P
[
max
:
()>0{X}e(+ 1)kL(

∗)
]
 e(+ 1)0L(
∗) +
∞∑
k=0
e(+ 1)L(
∗)mk−ek
= e(+ 1)L(
∗)
(
0 +
∞∑
k=0
mk−ek
)
e(+ 1)L(
∗)(0 + 2m−e00 ).
For the ﬁrst inequality, we use Ineq. (12) and P[max:
()>0 {X} i]1 for i = 0, . . . , e(+ 1)0L(
∗) − 1. In the
second inequality, we change the variable of the summation. The third inequality follows from Ineq. (13). For the last
inequality, we ﬁrst observe that k−ek−ek0 for all k0. Hence,
∞∑
k=0
mk−ekm
∞∑
k=0
(k−e0 )
k2m−e00
because k−e0 1/2. For0 = 2 logm/ log logm,weobtain that−e00 m−1, for everym4.Therefore, SC(p)2e(+
1)(logm/ log logm + 1)L(
∗). 
Bounding the coordination ratio: Our ﬁnal step is to show that the maximum expected delay of every NE is a good
approximation to the optimal maximum latency. Then, we can apply Lemma 7 to bound the coordination ratio for our
selﬁsh routing game.
Lemma 5. Let 
∗ be the optimal unsplittable ﬂow. For every ﬂow 
 corresponding to a mixed strategies proﬁle p at
NE, L(
)3L(
∗).
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Proof. The proof is based on Dorn’s Theorem [5] which establishes strong duality in quadratic programming. 9 Let 
∗f
be the optimal splittable ﬂow. We use quadratic programming duality to prove that for any ﬂow 
 at
Nash equilibrium, the minimum expected delay min(
) cannot exceed L(
∗f ) + wmax. This implies the lemma
because L(
)min(
) + wmax, since 
 is at Nash equilibrium, and L(
∗) max{L(
∗f ), wmax}, since 
∗ is an
unsplittable ﬂow.
Let Q be the square matrix describing the number of edges shared by each pair of paths. Formally, Q is a |P| × |P|
matrix and for every , ′ ∈ P , Q[, ′] = | ∩ ′|. By deﬁnition, Q is symmetric. Next we prove that Q is positive
semi-deﬁnite10
xTQx = ∑
∈P
x()
∑
′∈P
Q[, ′]x(′) = ∑
∈P
x()
∑
′∈P
| ∩ ′|x(′) = ∑
∈P
x()
∑
e∈
∑
′:e∈′
x(′)
= ∑
∈P
x()
∑
e∈
e(x) = ∑
e∈E
e(x)
∑
:e∈
x() = ∑
e∈E
2e(x)0.
First recall that for each edge e, e(x) ≡ ∑:e∈ x(). The third and the ﬁfth equalities follow by reversing the order
of summation. In particular, in the third equality, instead of considering the edges shared by  and ′, for all ′ ∈ P ,
we consider all the paths ′ using each edge e ∈ . On both sides of the ﬁfth inequality, for every edge e ∈ E, e(x) is
multiplied by the sum of x() over all the paths  using e.
Let 
 also denote the |P|-dimensional vector corresponding to the ﬂow 
. Then, the th coordinate of Q
 is equal
to the expected delay (
) on the path , and the total latency of 
 is C(
) = 
TQ
.
Therefore, the problem of computing a feasible splittable ﬂow of minimum total latency is equivalent to computing
the optimal solution to the following quadratic program: min
{

TQ
 : 1T
Wtot, 
0
}
, where 1/0 denotes the |P|-
dimensional vector having 1/0 in each coordinate. Also notice that no ﬂow of value strictly greater than Wtot can be
optimal for this program. This quadratic program is clearly feasible and its optimal solution is 
∗f (Lemma 7).
The Dorn’s dual of this quadratic program is: max
{
zWtot − 
TQ
 : 2Q
1z, z0
} (e.g., [5], [1, Chapter 6]). We
observe that any ﬂow 
 can be regarded as a feasible solution to the dual program by setting z = 2min(
). Hence, both
the primal and the dual programs are feasible. By Dorn’s Theorem [5], the objective value of the optimal dual solution
is exactly C(
∗f ). 11
Let 
 be any feasible ﬂow at Nash equilibrium. Setting z = 2min(
), we obtain a dual feasible solution. By the
discussion above, the objective value of the feasible dual solution (
, 2min(
)) cannot exceed C(
∗f ). In other words,
2min(
)Wtot − C(
)C(
∗f ). (14)
Since 
 is at Nash equilibrium, L(
)min(
) + wmax. In addition, by Ineq. (9), the average latency of 
 cannot
exceed its maximum latency. Thus,
C(
)L(
)Wtotmin(
)Wtot + wmaxWtot.
Combining the inequality above with Ineq. (14), we obtain that min(
)WtotC(
∗f ) + wmaxWtot. Using C(
∗f ) =
L(
∗f )Wtot, we conclude that 
min(
)L(
∗f ) + wmax. 
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 7 and 7.
Theorem 2. The price of anarchy of any -layered network congestion game with resource delays equal to their loads
is at most 8e(logm/ log logm + 1).
9 Let min
{
xTQx + cTx : Axb, x0
}
be the primal quadratic program. The Dorn’s dual of this program is max
{
−yTQy + bTu :
ATu − 2Qyc, u0
}
. Dorn [5] proved strong duality when the matrix Q is symmetric and positive semi-deﬁnite. Thus, if Q is symmetric
and positive semi-deﬁnite and both the primal and the dual programs are feasible, their optimal solutions have the same objective value.
10 A n × n matrix Q is positive semi-deﬁnite if for every vector x ∈ Rn, xTQx0.
11 More speciﬁcally, the optimal dual solution is obtained from 
∗
f
by setting z = 2min(
∗
f
). Since L(
∗
f
) = min(
∗
f
) and C(
∗
f
) = L(
∗
f
)Wtot ,
the objective value of this solution is 2min(
∗
f
)Wtot − C(
∗f ) = C(
∗f ).
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